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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the State of Utah

RAY PHEBUS, JOE T. JUHAN, and
ASHLEY YALLEY OIL COMPANY,
a corporation,
Platintiffs and
Fetitioners
Case No.
7187

vs.
WM. S'TANLEY D~UNFORD, Judge of
the District Court, Uintah County, and
N. J. MEAGHER,
Defendamts mnd
Besponden,ts.

RE.S:PONDENTS' BRIEF
The sole complaint of the plaintiffs here seems to
be that the trial court in its interlocutory order of May
4, 1948, set aside its judgment of April 15, 1946, as to
Joe T. Juhan and Ashley Oil Company, and did not
include therein Ray Phebus.
It is significant that the petition for writ of mandamus does not allege any prejudice to Ray Phebus, but
does allege prejudice to Joe T. Juhan and Ashley Valley
Oil Company.
1
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Our position is that no one was prejudiced, unless
it can be said that failure to set aside the judgment for
$32.30 costs as against Ray Phebus is sufficient reason
for this court to issue a permanent writ. We regard that
as trivial, as a tail to tie a kite to, and a matter, moreover, that the trial court would have acted upon imm·ediately if it had been called to that court's attention.
Obviously, what disturbed the plaintiffs here was
the injunctive feature of the judgment of April15, 1946;
it is not difficult to surmise that they were formulating
plans to go into possession of the real property, the
subject of the action in the trial court, for the purpose
of conducting drilling operations. They would, of course,
have such right if they were the sole owners of the profit
a prendre rights under the lease, which the trial court
held invalid, and which this court held to be valid;
whether they have those rights in entirety, and whether
they would have rights of possession for drilling purposes if it is held they have only fractional rights profit a prendre, are questions yet to be decided; and since
this court did not decide them we must look in the first
instance to the trial court for a determination.
In any view of the case, did Ray Phebus have any
rights of possession at the date of the trial court's
judgment of April15, 1946~ That judgment, unlike many
judgments in quiet title cases did not purport to settle
issues as of the date of commencement of the action; it
is written in entirety in the present tense.

2
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Plaintiffs in their brief ( p. 31) say'' Phebus quitclaimed to Juhan under date of
January 19, 1945, during the pendency of the
action. Juhan, in part, claims by, through and
under Phebus. If the original judgment is perIuitted to stand, then Juhan is out of the picture to the extent of the interest quitclaimed to
him by Phebus and, regardless of the intention,
the language used by this court and the issues
raised by the pleading at the trial, a question of
title will have been determined. * * * ''
If we understand the purport of that statement, it
represents at least a novel idea in construction. We cannot understand how a deed can be construed as passing
something from the grantor that the grantee does not
receive; in other words, how Phebus could be put out of
the picture and Juhan not be put in.
There is nothing in the interlocutory order entered
by the trial court that even remotely suggests that the
judge had in mind a denial to Juhan of the benefits of
his deed from Phebus, and Juhan's rights, whatever
they are, undoubtedly can be and will be given proper
consideration if and when this matter is brought before
the court for its determination. The defendant Meagher
is not concerned whether a judgment be now entered adjudicating rights as of the date of commencement of
the action, or as of the date of the trial court's judgment, and obviously the defendant judge is not concerned.
It is a matter for the plaintiffs here to decidewhether they want a decree as of the date of commence-
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ment to t he effect that Phebus had the rights, or as of
the date of the judgment to the effect that the Phebus
righs had then passed to Juhan. Until they present this
matter to the trial court they are not hurt.
We find nothing in the decision of this court to
indicate that the trial court was not justified in its position that Phebus was out of the picture because of his
deed to Juhan; indeed this court in its decision, if it took
any position on that subject, took the same position as
the trial court seems to have taken. After stating"On January 19, 1945, Phebus quitelaim·ed
his interest to Juhan.''
The court proceeds. "Briefly the above sets out the chain of title
of the various parties concerned, leaving as interested parties in the proceeding, plaintiff
Meagher, and defendants Ashley Valley Oil Company and Juhan.''
We do not construe these statements as indicating
what this court expected the trial court to do when it
remanded the case for proceedings to conform to this
opinion. We think the court decided one question onlythat the lease was valid and still in existence. That questjon is set at rest and neither defendant here has any
intention of ignoring it, or trying to evaporate it.
We think there is much to be done yet in this case,
and the plaintiffs here seem to be in agreement. They
say (Brief, p. 17), 'But here we have a situation that requires
affirmative action in order to h·ring about complete restitution o nthe record. In a suit to quiet
4
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title, where real property is involved, those
things that affect the record and constitute clouds
on the title become and are the controlling matters, and it is the record title that must be restored and the clouds on the same expunged in
order to bring about complete restitution.''
The record in this case discloses at least three types
of right involved-title to the fee; impacts on that title
by the rights of lesees to entry for exploration, development and production; rights to receive royalty, original
and overriding. This court paid no attention to the
questions concerning who now has what rights nor what
impact such rights, when determined, are to have on the
plaintiff's (N.J. ~leagher) title. We agree that affirmative action in the trial court is necessary; we wonder
why the plaintiffs have not instituted such action.
We agree with plaintiffs' position, indicated by the
quotation from Missouri, K. & T. Trust Co. v. Clark,
60 Neb. 406, 83 N.W. 202, 203 (Brief pp. 20-21)"When the judgment of a trial court has
been reversed in an error proceeding, the court
should retrace its steps to the point when the
first material error occurred. It should put the
litigants back where they were when the initial
mistake was committed.''
A new or amended decree as of the date of the
former decree, based on appropriate findings of fact
and conclusions of law, in our opinion will do just that.
'This was a suit to quiet title; in such proceeding the
court has jurisdiction to determine all questions affecting the title as to the respective parties. 44 Am. Jur.
Quieting Title, Sec. 70 et seq. W ~ quote brief excerpts:
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''Sec. 70, p. 56. Generally, the court should
and will by its decree, adjust all the equities of
ail the parties to the action, and determine the
status of all controverted claims to or against
the property. The general principle that equity,
having taken cognizance of a cause of action, will
decree such relief as is necessary to completely
and finally dispose of the controversy, is ordinarily applicable in the actions here under consideration. * * *''
Again at Sec. 94, p. 79 :
"Sec. 94. * * * Generally, the decree should
adjust all equities between the parties to the
action, and determine the status of all controverted claims to or interests in the property which
are shown to exist at the time when the decree is
rendered, regardless of character, whether absolute or contingent, present or future. * * • ''
Now if the court below had decided, as this court did,
that the lease was in existence, it would logically have
made its decree settling and adjusting all the questions
as above indicated. Our position is that, inasmuch as
this court settled only one question, the status of the
lease, the court below should take- up where it left off
and make a complete disposition of the case.
The order made by the court below is certainly subject to the construction that the court had in mind the
above principles, and that instead of intending to deny
or prejudice the rights of any party, it was expressly
designed to safeguard them. At the date of the decree the
Phebus rights, whatever they were, had been conveyed
by deed to Juhan. That is what the plaintiffs here claim.
They do not claim that Phebus is prejudiced by a reeog6
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nition of that transfer, and certainly Juhan could not
be because the order sets aside the decree in so far as it
effected his interests. As to Ashley Valley Oil Company,
nothing is made to appear that it would have been prejudiced in any way.
The following authorities, taken from the annotations in 28 U.S.C.A., Sec. 877, note numbers as indicated,
throw additional light on this subject:
N. 266.- 'Yhile the rule that an adjudication
by an appellate tribunal becomes the law of the
case on all su'bsequent trials is a wholesome one,
which should be enforced, yet it should be confined to questions that were actually conside-red
and decided, and not extended to dicta or intimations contained in an opinion which may be
thought to foreshadow the views of the court on
other questions. Patillo v. Allen-West Commission
Co. (Ark. 1901) 108 F. 723, 47 C.C.A. 637.
N. 267.- Where a decree dismissing a suit
is reversed on appeal, and the case remanded for
further action, only the questions which were considered and determined by the appellate court are
concluded by its decision. General Inv. Co. v. Lake
Shore & M.S. Ry. Co. ( C.C.A. Ohio, 1920) 269
F. 235 modified (1922) 43 S. Ct. 106, 260 U:S.. 261,
67 L. Ed. 244.
Where, on appeal to the Supreme Court in an
admiralty case, a question of recoupment was left
open by its opinion and the mandate to the District Court, the latter is "at liberty to consider
and decide the question of recoupmen, entirely
unaffected by the mandate, and the action of that
court in allowing or denying such recoupment is
open to review in the Circuit Court of Appeals
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only." The New York (Mich. 1900) 104 F. 561, 44
C.C.A. 38.
N. 2'68.- When an appellate court definitely
describes the decree to be entered in the court
below, there is no discretion in the latter court,
but its duty is to obey the mandate and enter
the decree accordingly, and when so entered it is
the decree of the appellate court, and an appeal
from it will be dismissed; but if the mandate does
not cover the entire case, but leaves something
undetermined, and to be inquired into and adjudicated, or if the court below misconstrues the
decree of the appellate court, and does not give
full effect to its mandate, a new appeal is an appropriate remedy. Great Northern Ry Co. v.
Western Union Telegraph Co. (Minn. 1909) 174
F. 321, 98 C.C.A. 193, certiorari denied (1910) 30
S. Ct. 574, 216 U.S. 619, 54 L. Ed. 640.
A judgment of reveral is not necessarily an
adjudication of any other than the questions in
terms discussed and decided. Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations of Kansas (1925) 45 S. Ct. 441, 267 U.S. 552, 69 L. Ed.
785, reversing (1924) 227 P. 249, 114 Kan. 487,
which modified on rehearing (1923) 219 P. 259,
114 Kan. 304.
On mandate of circuit court of appeals, remanding case to Supreme Court of Porto Rico
''for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion,'' held Supreme Court properly reviewed case on its merits; the opinion not disposing of, though incidentally referring to, facts
and merits. Gandia v. Porto Rico Fertilizer Co.
(C.C.A. Porto Rico, 1924) 2 F. (2d) 641.
In suit to cancel oil and gas lease, where Circuit Court of Appeals reversed decree adverse to
plaintiff, and ruled that he was entitled to can8
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cellation of lease, except a~ to small acreage about
two wells already drilled, held, decree of district
court entered on 1nandate of circuit court of appeals, should have awarded full relief naturally
applicable to plaintiff's situation, though not expressly directed, such as injunction against continued occupation or use of leased premises, except as to the two wells and pipe line thereto, and
order for payment of rentals then accumulated
under tender and for accounting for value of un_:.
authorized use of premises. White v. Dawson
(C.C.A. Ky.1927) 18 F. (2d) 471.
K. 269.- A procedendo is a writ from a
higher to a lower court, directing that the case
be proceeded with. It does not undertake to say
what the decision shall be, but merely that there
shall be one, and where there is a reversal the
case is thereupon taken up in the court below at
the point where the erroneous judgment was
rendered. Exchange Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. WarsawWilkinson Co. (Pa. 1910) 185 F. 487, 107 C.C.A.
587, denying motion to amend mandate (1910)
181 F. 330, 104 C.C.A. 518.
\Vhen a decree is reversed, and the mandat~
does not direct the entry of any particular decree,
but only that further proceedings be had not inconsistent with the opinion of the appellate court,
the effect is to put the case in the same position
in the court below as if no decree had ever been
entered; and the court has the same authority to
permit amendments of the pleadings to enlarge
the issues, and admit further proofs, as it had before the entry of the decree. Hawkins v. Cleveland, C., C & St. L. Ry. Co. (Ind. 1900) 99 F. 322
39 C.C.A. 538, denying mandate motion to modify
(1898) 89 F. 266,32 C.C.A.198.
And in Fisher v. Hurst (Jan. 30, 1948), 68 S. Ct.
9
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389, quoting head note 2, the Supreme Court of the
United States in a Per Curiam de·cision, said:
''Whether state of Oklahoma was following
or disobeying mandate of United States Supreme
Court, as applied by Oklahoma district court,
* * * should be determined in the first instance
by Oklahoma district court, and not by United
States Supreme Court in mandamus proceeding
by Negro applicant to compel compliance with
United States Supreme Court's mandate."
We think the alternative write heretofore issued
should be recaHed and this proceeding dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,

KATHERINE M. IVERS
HERBERT VAN DA:M
Attorneys fo'r Respondents
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